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Abstract
This paper studies the consequences for the electoral process of reputational and partisan
imbalance; that is, asymmetries in voters’ evaluations of candidates’ quality (for example, due
to incumbency) and of party labels (for example, due to ideology). Our theory is predicated
on the notion that voters are “rationally ignorant” as they face cognitive constraints on their
ability to acquire and process political information. Our model rationalizes key empirical
regularities identified in the literature: the strong effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes,
the existence of an incumbency spending advantage, as well as the moderate electoral impact
of partisan redistricting. We explain why current methods used to identify the sources of the
incumbency advantage are likely to produce biased estimates, and suggest ways to resolve this
issue. We also highlight how campaign finance reforms should be precisely tailored to the type
and level of imbalance they are meant to address.
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Competitive elections are a necessary condition for the good functioning of the democratic
system (Schumpeter, 1942). In practice, however, many electoral races experience very little com-
petition. This phenomenon has often been attributed to asymmetries in voters’ evaluation of the
political options available to them, which we refer to as electoral imbalances. Two types of imbal-
ances, in particular, have received considerable attention from empirical researchers: ‘reputational
imbalance’ (defined as ex-ante asymmetries in voters’ beliefs about candidates’ quality) and ‘parti-
san imbalance’ (defined as ex-ante asymmetries in voters’ opinion of party labels). Overall, two key
findings emerge from the literature. First, the effect of reputational imbalance is large: a candidate’s
greater reputation (often associated with incumbency) translates into a sizable electoral advantage
(e.g., Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993; Ansolabehere et al., 2000). Second,
the impact of partisan imbalance is moderate: the electoral benefit of greater partisan alignment
between a party and the electorate (measured through redistricting) is positive, but limited (e.g.,
Abramowitz, 1983; Niemi and Winsky, 1992; Gelman and King, 1994).
This paper provides a unified theoretical framework to study the consequences of reputational
and partisan imbalances on candidates’ behavior and electoral outcomes. Unlike previous works
which focus on candidates’ behavior and thus reduce voters’ role to their electoral decision, our
theory is predicated on the notion that voters are also active participants during electoral cam-
paigns. We consider ‘rationally ignorant’ voters (Downs, 1957) who face cognitive constraints on
their ability to acquire and process political information: voters need to pay costly attention to
candidates to learn their platform.1 In equilibrium, reputational and partisan imbalances affect
how much attention voters allocate to each candidate. Due in great part to voters’ strategic behav-
ior, campaigns exacerbate reputational imbalance and mitigate partisan imbalance. Consequently,
empirical evaluations of the effects of electoral imbalances which do not properly control for voter
attention potentially suffer from severe omitted variable bias.
Our model features a representative voter (to whom we reserve the pronoun ‘she’) and two
candidates (1 and 2). Candidates are office-motivated and commit either to a partisan policy
(e.g., prohibiting the use of federal funding for abortion) or a common value policy (e.g., reforming
the education system). The common value policy maximizes the voter’s payoff, but is costly to
1The importance of voter attention to politicians’ promises and actions, especially when it comes to common
value issues, is documented in Bidwell et al. (2015) and (indirectly) in Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010).
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implement for politicians. We assume that this implementation cost is such that ‘low-quality’
candidates always prefer to propose the partisan policy, whereas ‘high-quality’ candidates are willing
to commit to the common value policy when the electoral reward for such commitment is sufficiently
high.
At first, the voter observes only candidates’ party label. She does not know whether candidates
are of high or low quality, but holds initially a higher opinion of candidate 1 (for example, due to
his status as incumbent). During the electoral campaign, the voter can learn a candidate’s policy
commitment. As in Prato and Wolton (2015), electoral communication requires attention by the
voter and campaign expenditures by the candidate. Attention and expenditures are complement
and positively correlated with the probability the voter learns the candidate’s platform. Absent
new information, the voter’s electoral decision depends on the realization of a partisan swing, which
is systematically more likely to favor candidate 1’s party (e.g., the voter leans Democrat).
To use the wordings in Lee et al. (2004), in our framework, reputational imbalance thus cor-
responds to the asymmetry in the voter’s belief regarding her ability to affect candidates’ policies.
In contrast, partisan imbalance represents her preference when she can only elect policies. As both
imbalances favor candidate 1, we henceforth refer to 1 (2) as the leading (trailing) candidate.
The probability that the voter’s preferred policy is implemented is maximized when both can-
didates commit to the common value policy when high quality. In this ‘responsive equilibrium’,
the voter pays attention to candidates in order to reduce the probability of an electoral mistake:
electing a low-quality candidate when a high-quality candidate is in the race.
In the case of reputational imbalance, the leading candidate 1 is more likely to be high-quality,
while the trailing candidate 2 is more likely to be low-quality. The most likely electoral mistake
therefore is to fail to elect a high-quality candidate 1. As a result, the voter pays more attention
to the leading candidate. Anticipating a more attentive electorate, and thus a higher return on
campaign expenditures, candidate 1 then outspends candidate 2. Consequently, the voter is always
more likely to learn candidate 1’s platform: this is the exacerbating effect of electoral campaign. As
a result, reputational imbalance translates into a sizable electoral and spending advantages for the
leading candidate.
A direct implication of this result is that incumbents (who tend to be of higher quality than
their challengers—e.g., Carson et al., 2007; Hirano and Snyder, 2009) win with greater probability.
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Importantly, this incumbency advantage is in significant part caused by the voter’s strategic choice
of attention. Consequently, our theory predicts that the incumbency advantage cannot be fully
explained by incumbents’ higher quality (as documented by Erikson and Titiunik, 2015; Hall and
Snyder, 2014) and spending advantages (as documented by Gerber, 1998).
Our results also have important implications for the identification of the sources of the in-
cumbency advantage. In our theory, voter attention is positively correlated with the incumbent’s
winning probability, reputation, and spending. Consequently, estimates of the effect of money or
quality on electoral outcomes are likely to suffer from an upward omitted variable bias when voter at-
tention is not properly controlled for. While the use of regression discontinuity (RD) designs—which
focus on races where voter attention is less likely to vary systematically across candidates—lessens
the severity of this issue, it does not necessarily eliminate it. Since our theory predicts that any
asymmetry in reputation is a significant source of bias, RD designs would produce unbiased estima-
tors only if voters hold the exact same opinion of closely elected incumbents and their challengers,
a condition unlikely to be satisfied given the electorate’s low political knowledge (e.g., Campbell et
al., 1960; Fowler, 2015).
In the case of partisan imbalance, the voter ex-ante favors candidate 1’s party and, everything
else equals, is more likely to elect him. Consequently, the most likely electoral mistake is to wrongly
elect a low-quality candidate 1. The voter thus pays more attention to the trailing candidate 2 who,
in turn, engages in greater campaign spending. The voter is then always more likely to learn the
trailing candidate 2’s platform: this is the mitigating effect of electoral campaign. The electoral
benefit generated by partisan imbalance is, therefore, limited. The leading candidate 1 is always
more likely to win, but his electoral gain is always smaller than the underlying level of partisan
imbalance.
Both reputational and partisan imbalances decrease electoral competition by improving the
standing of the leading candidate. However, this paper shows that, as long as the responsive
equilibrium exists, imbalances increase the (ex-ante) probability that the common value policy is
implemented. A decline in electoral competition need not reduce electoral accountability. The
voter is hurt by the presence of electoral imbalances only when the level of reputational or partisan
imbalance is large and the responsive equilibrium does not exist. While the consequence of large
level of either type of imbalance is the same, the causes are markedly different. When reputational
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imbalance is large, the responsive equilibrium does not exist because the voter pays too little
attention to the trailing candidate 2, who has little incentive to commit to the common value
policy. When partisan imbalance is large, the responsive equilibrium does not exist because the
voter pays too little attention to the leading candidate. Our theory highlights that the impacts
of electoral imbalances for electoral accountability depend on their type and level, and so should
the design of any regulatory solution (e.g., caps on campaign spending, non-partisan redistricting)
aimed at reducing electoral imbalances.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we review the relevant formal literature.
In Section 2, we describe the model. We present some important preliminary results in Section 3.
Section 4 studies the effect of reputational imbalance, while Section 5 considers partisan imbalance.
Section 6 examines the joint consequences of both types of electoral imbalance. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are collected in a supplemental appendix available on the authors’ website.2
1 Formal literature on electoral imbalances
Most of the formal literature on electoral imbalance examine the source of the incumbency advan-
tage. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) show how the incumbency advantage can emerge
as a result of the voter’s higher opinion of the incumbent and the scare-off of talented challengers.
Recent empirical findings, however, have called into question the importance of the scare-off effect
(Hall and Snyder, 2015).3 In a similar vein, Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985) explain why incum-
bents, who are well-known due to their past record, are often preferred to unknown challengers by
risk-adverse voters. Gordon and Landa (2009) examine different sources of the incumbency advan-
tage and discuss whether they advantage all incumbents. In like manner, Kartik and Van Weelden
(2015) consider how term limits can benefit or hurt incumbents depending on whether voters are
primarily concerned about ideological congruence or corruption. None of these papers, however,
incorporates campaign expenditures and thus cannot explain the incumbency spending advantage.
In contrast, Meirowitz (2008), Pastine and Pastine (2012), and Werner and Mayer (2012) suppose
that incumbents have a greater ability to collect campaign funds which serve to persuade voters.
2https://sites.google.com/site/carloprato1982/research and http://home.uchicago.edu/ swolton/Research.html
3See Cox and Katz (1996) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) for a more positive assessment of the impact of the
scare-off effect.
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The resulting incumbency spending advantage is then the key determinant of incumbents’ electoral
advantage. Our paper complements these studies by providing a theoretical foundation for the
persuasive role of campaign expenditures and shows that the incumbency spending advantage can
arise even in the absence of a competitive edge in fund-raising.
Few theoretical works analyze the consequence of partisan imbalance in a political agency set-
ting.4 Among these, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) study a legislator’s allocation of
effort between policy-making and constituency service. As in our paper, a low level of imbalance
can benefit the voter by increasing the provision of constituency service. They do not consider,
however, the consequences of partisan imbalance on electoral outcomes.
Each of these papers studies one type of imbalance in isolation5 and mostly focuses on candidate’s
incentives. In contrast, voters’ strategic behavior plays a critical role in our set-up. Following the
approach developed by Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and Hafer and Landa (2007), we assume
that voters’ (receivers’) information is endogenous to their level of attention and to candidates’
expenditures (sender’s effort) during the electoral campaign. Prato and Wolton (2015) use this
communication technology to highlight that voters’ lack of attention does not always imply a lack
of interest in politics. As they study a fully symmetric setting, imbalances play no role in their
analysis. Other models of electoral campaigns are unidirectional: with either candidates informing
voters (e.g., Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006; Dewan and Hortala-Vallve, 2013) or voters
learning about candidates (e.g., Martinelli, 2006; Svolik, 2013; Hortala-Vallve et al., 2013).
2 The model
We analyze a one-period, three-player game with two candidates (1 and 2 from party 1 and 2,
respectively) and a representative voter. Candidates compete for an elected office which they value.
Before the campaign, candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his quality tj ∈ {h, l}, where h denotes
high-quality and l denotes low-quality. It is common knowledge that the ex-ante probability that
candidate j is high-quality is qj = Pr(tj = h). After observing his quality, candidate j chooses
4It is well known that in a Downsian framework, partisan imbalance can induce candidates to take more extreme
positions (Wittman, 1985; Groseclose, 2001; Aragone´s and Palfrey, 2002).
5Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) include partisan imbalances in their model, but limit their analysis to
their effect on the incumbency advantage rather than candidates’ strategic behaviour.
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whether to commit to a common value policy pj = 1 or a partisan policy pj = 0. The cost of
implementing the common value policy depends on a candidate’s quality (t ∈ {h, l}) and is equal
to kt. At the end of the campaign, the voter elects one of the two candidates e ∈ {1, 2}.
At the beginning of the campaign, the voter does not know candidates’ quality and platform.
Consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Alvarez, 1997; Peterson, 2009), the voter, however, can
learn candidates’ policy commitment during the electoral campaign. The likelihood that the voter
learns the platform of candidate j ∈ {1, 2} depends on his campaign expenditures (yj) and her
attention to candidate j’s messages (xj).
6 Both are endogenous in our theory. They are also costly.
For candidate j, this cost corresponds to the cost of raising money for political advertising or
campaign meetings (for empirical evidence, see Schuster, 2015); it is parametrized by the function
C(y) = y2+λ/(2 + λ), λ > 0. For the voter, this cost captures cognitive constraints and/or the
opportunity cost of paying attention to politics; it is parametrized by Cv(xj) = x
2+λ
j /(2 + λ).
7 For
tractability reason, we assume that the probability that the voter learns candidate j’s platform at
the end of the campaign is xjyj.
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Our approach to electoral campaign has three important features. First, in line with the con-
cept of rational ignorance (e.g., Downs, 1957), the voter needs to pay costly attention to become
informed.9 Second, voter’s level of attention and candidates’ campaign expenditures are comple-
ment. Candidates’ campaign spending is more effective when the voter pays high attention, and
vice versa. Lastly, the voter can pay different levels of attention to different candidates. Only the
first feature is crucial: assuming weaker forms of complementarity and directed communication,
albeit complicating the analysis, does not affect our results.
The voter values the common-value policy, but also has preferences over candidates’ partisan
policies.10 When the elected politician implements the common value policy, the voter receives
6Importantly, we focus exclusively on campaign expenditures meant to inform the voter about a candidate’s
platform and hold constant other potentially relevant types of campaign spending, such as negative advertising or
get-out-of-the-vote activities.
7The choice of a specific cost function is mostly to simplify the analysis as most of our results carry through under
more general assumptions. In the Appendix, we prove Propositions 1, 2, as well as Properties 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4 for a
larger class of cost functions.
8The main results of this paper are unchanged if the voter also receives a sufficiently noisy signal of the candidate’s
quality during the electoral campaign.
9Prato and Wolton (2015) show that the assumption of a representative voter plays no substantive role (despite
the presence of free-riding). Introducing multiple voters, however, makes the analysis significantly more complicated.
10For a similar formulation of the voter’s payoffs, albeit with a different justification, see Galasso and Nannicini
(2011).
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a payoff of 1.11 When the elected politician implements the partisan policy, the voter’s payoff is
uv(θ, e), where θ is a partisan swing affecting the voter’s evaluation of partisan policies. The partisan
swing θ is revealed to the voter after the electoral campaign, but before her electoral decision (as in
probabilistic voting models—e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). For ease of exposition, we suppose
that θ ∈ {1, 2} and uv(1, 1) = uv(2, 2) = ξ > 0, while uv(1, 2) = uv(2, 1) = 0. It is common
knowledge that Pr(θ = j) = pij, j ∈ {1, 2}. The voter’s utility also includes the cost of attention
(x1, x2) described above and assumes the following form:
Uv(pe, x1, x2) = pe + (1− pe)uv(θ, e)− x
2+λ
1 + x
2+λ
2
2 + λ
(1)
Candidates are office-motivated. We normalize their utility from being out of office to 0. When
in office, the elected candidate gets a payoff of 1. In addition, if elected on a common value platform
(p = 1), he must pay the ‘implementation cost’ kt, t ∈ {h, l}. This cost corresponds to time spent
doing constituency service, or assembling coalitions and bargaining with veto players in order to
pass legislation beneficial to the voter (Hall and Deardoff, 2006). We assume 0 < kh < 1 < kl: only
high-quality candidates can implement the common value policy.12 As described above, candidate
j ∈ {1, 2} can also incur costly campaign expenditures (yj) to inform the voter. Candidate j’s
utility can thus be expressed as:
Uj(pj, yj; t) =
 1− ktpj −
y2+λj
2+λ
if elected
−y
2+λ
j
2+λ
otherwise
(2)
To summarize, the timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws the candidates’ quality: tj ∈ {h, l}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
11Examples of common-value policies include attracting public and private investments into the district (e.g.,
revamping a disaffected shipyard), or a commitment to reform a relatively non-ideological policy domain (e.g., trade
treaty pledge, energy independence, reforming the National Health Service in the U.K.). As explained by Aldrich
(1995, p.250 emphasis added), “voters are very likely to support the presidential nominee of the party they believe
is better able to solve the problem they consider most serious at the time of election. Far fewer today think it
matters which party holds power at least in term of addressing their most important concerns.”More succinctly, as
former NYC mayor Fiorello La Guardia reportedly said, “there is no Republican or Democratic way of picking up
the garbage.”
12This cost could also correspond to a politician’s willingness to compromise on his ideology. Consider an alternative
formulation of the policy space as p ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Suppose that candidate 1’s (2’s) office and policy payoffs satisfy
1 − kt(0 − p)2 (1 − kt(2 − p)2), where 0 (2) is candidate 1’s (2’s) ideal point. A high-quality candidate is then a
moderate politician willing to implement the voter’s preferred policy if given the proper electoral incentives.
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2. Candidate j ∈ {1, 2} observes (only) his quality and chooses whether to credibly commit to
the common value (pj = 1) or partisan (pj = 0) policy.
3. The electoral campaign takes place. Candidates 1 and 2, and the voter choose, respectively,
campaign expenditures and attention y1, y2, and (x1, x2). With probability xjyj, the voter
observes candidate j’s platform, otherwise she does not learn pj.
4. The partisan swing θ ∈ {1, 2} is realized and the voter elects one of the two candidates:
e ∈ {1, 2}.
5. The elected candidate e implements pe and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies (allowing the
voter to toss a fair coin when indifferent), excluding weakly-dominated strategies.13 Henceforth,
‘equilibrium’ refers to this class of equilibria.
To conclude the description of the model, we introduce our definition of reputational and partisan
imbalances, assuming (without loss of generality) that candidate 1 is the leading candidate. In our
set-up, reputational imbalance corresponds to the voter’s a priori favorable evaluation of candidate
1’s quality: Pr(t1 = h) = q1 ≥ Pr(t2 = h) = q2. For ease of exposition, we assume that q1 = 1+φ2 and
q2 =
1−φ
2
so φ ≥ 0 represents the level of reputational imbalance.14 Partisan imbalance corresponds
to the voter’s a priori favorable evaluation of candidate 1’s party label: Pr(θ = 1) = pi1 ≥ Pr(θ =
2) = pi2. For ease of exposition, we assume that pi1 =
1+δ
2
and pi2 =
1−δ
2
so δ ≥ 0 represents the level
of partisan imbalance. Using the wording in Lee et al. (2004), reputational imbalance captures
asymmetries in the voter’s belief about her ability to affect candidates’ policies, whereas partisan
imbalance corresponds to asymmetries in her evaluation of a party when she only elects policies.
Reputational imbalance can have several possible origins. A prominent source (especially in
the context of the U.S.) is a candidate’s incumbency status. Indeed, incumbents tend to be more
productive and of higher quality than challengers (Erikson, 1971; Carson et al., 2007; Cox and Katz,
1996; Hirano and Snyder, 2009) due, among other things, to selection effects (Zaller, 1998; Ashworth
and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). Reputational imbalance can also arise as a result of a candidate’s
seniority or leadership position in the legislature or of endorsements by important politicians or
13A formal definition of equilibrium can be found in Appendix A.
14All our results hold for q1 = q + φ/2 for q not too large (but strictly greater than 1/2).
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celebrities (Garthwaite and Moore, 2013). Assuming that the voter cares primarily about outcomes
rather than policies, reputational imbalance can also reflect a party’s advantage when it comes to
the most important issue faced by the voter. Indeed, it is well known that parties have owned
issues, defined as a “reputation for greater competence on handling” these issues (Petrocik, 1996;
p.825). Examples include health care reforms for Democrats or inflation for Republicans.
In contrast, partisan imbalance arises from the notion that parties are informative labels (Downs,
1957; Aldrich, 1995; Snyder and Ting, 2002) associated with well-defined policy positions on certain
issues such as gun controls, abortion rights, public signs in the public sphere. The function uv(θ, j)
thus corresponds the voter’s payoff from the policy bundle traditionally associated with party j ∈
{1, 2} and depends on factors beyond candidates’ control. Ex-ante, however, candidates have some
expectations about voters’ partisan leaning (e.g., due to the partisan composition of the candidates’
constituency) and use this knowledge to inform their platform and communication choices. To make
the model interesting, we assume that the voter prefers the common value policy (ξ < 1), but absent
any additional information, voters use party labels to evaluate candidates (ξ > q1 ⇔ φ ≤ 2ξ− 1).15
3 Preliminary results
Due to the implementation cost kt, the voter and candidates have conflicting preferences. A high-
quality candidate is willing to commit to the common value policy only when this commitment is
appropriately rewarded by an increase in his wining probability.
The electoral reward for committing to the common value policy depends critically on the
probability that the voter learns a candidate’s platform during the campaign (xjyj). Intuitively, in
any equilibrium, only candidates promising p = 1 incur campaign expenditures. A candidate who
proposes the partisan policy has no interest in revealing his platform since it never improves his
electoral appeal: the voter would only learn that the candidate proposes a suboptimal platform.
Voter attention, in turn, is driven by the possibility of detecting a high-quality candidate who
commits to the common value policy. This reasoning directly implies that there always exists an
’unresponsive equilibrium’ in which candidates always propose the partisan policy, do not engage
15The last inequality is only a sufficient condition for all our results to carry through. A necessary condition is
that the voter always bases her electoral decision on her partisan payoff uv(θ, j) when she does not learn candidates’
platforms.
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in campaign spending, and the voter pays no attention to the campaign.
In this unresponsive equilibrium, the probability that the voter’s preferred policy is implemented
is minimized, and so is her welfare. In contrast, voter welfare is maximized when candidates from
both parties commit to the common value policy when high quality.16 For this ‘responsive equilib-
rium’ to exist, high-quality candidates’ electoral reward for committing to the common value policy
must dominate the communication and implementation costs. To determine when this condition
holds, we first characterize the voter’s choice of attention and candidates’ campaign expenditures
in the responsive equilibrium (assuming it exists).
Proposition 1. In the responsive equilibrium,
(i) low-quality candidates do not incur campaign expenditure: y∗j (l) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}
(ii) high-quality candidates’ campaign expenditures and the voter’s levels of attention are determined
by the unique solution to the following system:
y∗1(h)
1+λ =
[
(1− δ) + 1−φ
2
δ
2
y∗2(h)x
∗
2
]
2
(1− kh)x∗1 (3)
y∗2(h)
1+λ =
[
(1 + δ)− 1+φ
2
δ
2
y∗1(h)x
∗
1
]
2
(1− kh)x∗2 (4)
(x∗1)
1+λ =
(
1 + φ
2
)2
1− δ
2
(1− ξ)y∗1(h) (5)
(x∗2)
1+λ =
(
1− φ
2
)2
1 + δ
2
(1− ξ)y∗2(h), (6)
A low-quality candidate does not incur campaign expenditures since he always commits to
the partisan policy. A high-quality candidate’s spending equalizes his marginal cost (C ′(y∗j (h)) =
y∗j (h)
1+λ, j ∈ {1, 2}) with his marginal benefit. The marginal benefit corresponds to the increase
in the probability that the voter learns his platform (taking into account that she might also learn
his opponent’s) times the payoff from being in office and implementing p = 1.
Voter attention towards candidate j ∈ {1, 2} equalizes her marginal cost (C ′v(x∗j) = (x∗j)1+λ)
with her marginal benefit. The marginal benefit corresponds to the gain from avoiding an electoral
mistake, which can be decomposed as follows: (i) the probability that j is high-quality and his
opponent −j is low-quality (qj(1 − q−j), with q1 = 1+φ2 = 1 − q2), (ii) the probability that the
16This equilibrium constitutes the voter’s constrained first best equilibrium, as formally shown in Appendix F.
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partisan swing does not favor candidate j (pi−j, with pi1 = 1+δ2 = 1 − pi2), and (iii) the expected
gain from detecting a high-quality candidate (1 − ξ). Components (i) and (ii), which depend on
reputational and partisan imbalances, play a critical role in the analyses that follow.
The next proposition shows that as long as the implementation cost is not too large, the re-
sponsive equilibrium always exists for moderate level of reputational imbalance (i.e., φ below some
threshold φ) or partisan imbalance (i.e., δ below some threshold δ).17 When imbalance is low, the
electoral reward for committing to the common value policy induced by voter attention is greater
than the (relatively) low implementation and campaign costs. When either type of imbalance is
large, this is no longer true. In the following sections, we analyze in detail how each type of imbal-
ance affects voters’ incentives to pay attention to candidates. We show that electoral imbalances
generate an asymmetry in the voter’s level of attention towards the two candidates, which in turns
generates an asymmetry in candidates’ electoral reward for committing to the common value policy.
When either type of imbalance is too large (φ above some threshold φ or δ above some threshold
δ), voter attention is too skewed towards one of the two candidates, and his opponent no longer
finds it profitable to commit to the common value policy.18
Proposition 2. There exists k
0
> 0 such that for all kh < k
0
:
1. Assuming no partisan imbalance (δ = 0), there exists φ, φ ∈ (0, 2ξ− 1]× [φ, 2ξ− 1] such that:
(i) for all φ ≤ φ, the responsive equilibrium exists;
(ii) for all φ > φ, the responsive equilibrium does not exist.
2. Assuming no reputational imbalance (φ = 0), there exists δ, δ ∈ (0, 1)× [δ, 1) such that
(i) for all δ ≤ δ, the responsive equilibrium exists;
(ii) for all δ > δ, the responsive equilibrium does not exists.
In what follows, we assume that the implementation cost satisfies k < k
0
and turn our attention
to the analysis of the consequences of reputational and partisan imbalances.
17To match the exposition of the results that follows, we state Proposition 2 for reputational and partisan imbal-
ances separately. In Section 6, we consider the case of positive levels of both reputational and partisan imbalances.
18While in general we cannot guarantee a unique threshold for each type of imbalance, in Appendix B, we show
that when the implementation cost kh is small enough, then the responsive equilibrium exists if and only if φ ≤ φ = φ
(Corollary B.1) and if and only if δ ≤ δ = δ (Corollary B.2).
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4 The consequences of reputational imbalance
In this section, we study the effect of reputational imbalance, fixing the level of partisan imbalance
to zero: δ = 0 so pi1 = pi2 = 1/2. In view of Proposition 2, we discuss separately the cases of
moderate and large levels of reputational imbalance.
4.1 Moderate level of reputational imbalance
By Proposition 2, the responsive equilibrium exists and this subsection characterizes its properties
(formally derived in Appendix C). An increase in reputational imbalance has no effect on candidates’
platform choices, but it affects voter’s choice of attention and candidates’ campaign expenditures.
Property 4.1. The voter always pays more attention to the leading candidate 1 than the trailing
candidate 2: x∗1 > x
∗
2 whenever φ > 0. Furthermore, voter attention towards the leading (trailing)
candidate increases (decreases) with reputational imbalance.
As explained above, the voter pays attention to avoid an electoral mistake: electing a low-quality
candidate j ∈ {1, 2} when his opponent is high quality. Since candidate 1 is more likely to be high
quality and candidate 2 low quality, the most likely electoral mistake is to fail to elect a high-quality
candidate 1. The voter thus pays more attention to the leading candidate 1, who thus benefits from
an ‘attention advantage.’
Absent partisan imbalance, high-quality candidates’ marginal benefit of campaign expenditures
does not directly depend on reputational imbalance, but only through voter attention (Equation 3
and Equation 4 become y∗j (h)
1+λ = 1−kh
2
x∗j , j ∈ {1, 2} after imposing δ = 0). Since voter atten-
tion increases the return on campaign spending and the voter pays more attention to the leading
candidate 1, 1 outspends the trailing candidate 2 (as illustrated in Figure 2a, to the left of φ).
Property 4.2. The leading candidate 1 always incurs higher campaign expenditures than the trail-
ing candidate 2: y∗1(h) > y
∗
2(h) whenever φ > 0. Furthermore, the leading (trailing) candidate’s
expenditures increase (decrease) with reputational imbalance.
In our theoretical framework, reputational imbalance translates into a sizable spending advan-
tage. Our theory thus predicts that a candidate spends more when his personal characteristics align
with the most important issue(s) of an election (such as being a war hero when national security
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is a top priority, or having a successful record as a reformer when government inefficiency is of
paramount importance). It also provides a new rationale for the incumbency spending advantage
documented in copious empirical studies (e.g., Green and Krasno, 1990; Jacobson, 1990; Gerber,
1998).19 In our set-up, this advantage emerges simply as a result of an incumbent’s higher qual-
ity; introducing a competitive edge in fund-raising (as assumed in previous studies) would only
reinforce our result (see footnote 21 for more details). Finally, in line with Bidwell et al.s’ (2015)
empirical findings, Property 4.2 indicates that candidates who experience a positive (resp., negative)
reputation shock increase (resp., decrease) their campaign expenditures.
Since reputational imbalance has opposite effects on the leading and trailing candidates’ spend-
ing, it is a priori unclear how total campaign expenditures vary with φ. The next property establishes
that, in line with empirical evidence, campaign expenditures are highest in ex-ante competitive races
(that is, races with little or no reputational imbalance) whenever the cost function C(·) is sufficiently
convex (so 1’s campaign expenditures do not increase too fast).
Property 4.3. For all λ >
√
3 − 1, total campaign expenditures (y∗1(h) + y∗2(h)) decrease with
reputational imbalance.
Since the voter pays more attention to the leading candidate 1, who also outspends his opponent,
she is more likely to detect a high-quality candidate 1 than a high-quality candidate 2. Electoral
campaigns have an exacerbating effect which translates reputational imbalance into a significant
electoral advantage (see Figure 2b for φ ≤ φ).
Property 4.4. The leading candidate 1’s (ex-ante) winning probability is strictly greater than 1/2
for φ > 0. Furthermore, his winning probability is strictly increasing with reputational imbalance.
A candidate always benefits electorally when his personal characteristics align with the elec-
torate’s main concerns. Further, it also shows how an incumbent’s greater reputation can translate
into an incumbency advantage—defined as the expected difference between the probability that
candidate j wins the election as an incumbent (i.e., φ > 0) and the probability he wins an open
seat election (i.e., φ = 0). Our comparative statics is consistent with the empirical finding that the
19While measures of incumbent spending advantage consider total campaign expenditures, Schuster (2015) shows
that this advantage is still present when restricting the sample to advertising expenditures.
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growth in the incumbency advantage is due to an increase in incumbent’s quality (Carson et al.,
2007).
Properties 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4 allow us to decompose the leading candidate’s electoral advantage
into three different components (represented in Figure 1): (i) the direct effect of reputational
imbalance (higher probability that candidate 1 is high-quality), (ii) the spending advantage, and
(iii) the attention advantage. Higher (expected) quality explains a significant part, but not all of
candidate 1’s electoral advantage. Indeed, the exacerbating effect of campaigns plays an important
role (compare in Figure 1 the plain black line representing the equilibrium winning probability and
the dotted purple line representing the counterfactual winning probability absent the exacerbating
effect). Our theory therefore rationalizes empirical evidence that the incumbency advantage cannot
be fully explained by incumbents’ better reputation (Erikson and Titiunik, 2015; Hall and Snyder,
2014).
Figure 1: Counterfactual analysis
The dark plain line corresponds to the leading candidate’s ex-ante equilibrium winning probability. The long-dashed
red line corresponds to his winning probability when campaign expenditures are held constant at their no imbalance
(φ = 0) level. The short-dashed blue line corresponds to candidate 1’s winning probability when voter’s levels
of attention are held constant at their no imbalance level. The dotted purple line corresponds to candidate 1’s
winning probability when campaign expenditures and attention are left at their no imbalance level. Parameter
values: kh = 0.075, kl = 1, ξ = 3/4, λ = 2.
Furthermore, most of the exacerbating effect comes from the attention advantage. Candidate
1’s counterfactual winning probability when campaign expenditures are fixed at their level with no
reputational imbalance (φ = 0) and voter attention is left at its equilibrium value is only slightly
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smaller than the equilibrium winning probability (compare the black and red dashed lines in Figure
1). As documented by Gerber (1998), the incumbent’s spending advantage can only explain a
portion of the incumbency advantage.
Conversely, candidate 1’s counterfactual winning probability when voter attention is fixed at its
level with no reputational imbalance and campaign expenditures are left at their equilibrium values
is significantly lower than the equilibrium winning probability (compare the black and short-dashed
blue lines in Figure 1). As the next Property shows, the electoral impact of the attention advantage
is always larger than the effect of the spending advantage.
Property 4.5. The effect of candidate 1’s greater campaign expenditures on his winning probability
is strictly lower than the effect of greater level of attention towards him.
The key intuition behind Property 4.5 is that voter attention directly depends on reputational
imbalance, whereas campaign expenditures depend on φ only through voter attention. As a result,
candidates’ campaign expenditures are less responsive to reputational imbalance than the voter’s
levels of attention.
The role of voter attention in the leading candidate’s electoral advantage uncovered in this paper
has important implications for the empirical analysis of the sources of the incumbency advantage.
Suppose that a researcher were to estimate the following model:
V = β0 + β1Quality + β2Money + η, (7)
where V is the incumbent’s vote share, Quality is a proxy for candidates’ quality, and Money
is candidates’ campaign expenditures. The results above suggest that Equation 7 is likely to be
mis-specified. Interpreting candidate 1’s interim winning probability (i.e., after candidates 1 and
2’s types have been realized) as his realized vote share and the ex-ante winning probability (i.e.,
before types’ realization) as leading candidates’ average vote share observed in the data,20 a more
appropriate specification according to our theoretical framework is:
V = β0 + β1Quality + β2Money + β3Attention+ , (8)
20Since our set-up includes a representative voter, the realized vote share in our model is always zero or one.
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Consequently, our theory predicts that naive estimates (i.e., Equation 7) of the sources of the
incumbency advantage suffers from omitted variable bias. Furthermore, this bias is positive since
voter’s levels of attention are positively correlated with the vote share, candidates’ perceived quality,
and campaign expenditures.
This omitted variable bias poses a strong challenge to correctly estimate the electoral return on
campaign expenditures. Controlling for candidates’ quality (as in Green and Krasno, 1988) is not
sufficient. An instrumental variable (IV) approach requires that the instrument be uncorrelated with
candidates’ quality and voter attention. To illustrate the severity of these exclusion restrictions,
consider candidates’ wealth, used in Gerber (1998). Since wealth is negatively correlated with the
cost of fund-raising, our theory implies that (everything else constant) the voter would pay more
attention to the candidate with the lowest cost of fund-raising.21 While the use of wealth as an
instrument for spending alleviates the omitted variable bias (the voter only reacts to the leading
candidate’s fund-raising edge), it does not eliminate it.
Another approach to eliminate this bias consists in developing a measure of ex-ante closeness
of a race and focus on the closest races, as asymmetries in the voter’s levels of attention should be
minimal. Notice, however, that even small level of imbalance can generate a significant exacerbating
effect (see Figure 1). As such, our theoretical framework suggests that the estimates in Erikson and
Palfrey (2000)—who do not focus exclusively on 50 − 50 races, but on a subsample close to that
threshold—are likely to be upwardly biased.22
In the absence of proper control for voter attention, our theoretical results suggest that a more
promising avenue for empirical research may be to measure the equilibrium effect of greater campaign
spending (e.g., using exogenous changes in regulation as in Hall, 2015).
Our findings also have implications for the identification of the personal incumbency advantage;
that is, the electoral benefit of simply being an incumbent (due, for example, to greater media
21In this case, candidate j’s campaign expenditures and voter attention towards j are defined by τjy
∗
j (h)
1+λ =
1−kh
2 x
∗
j and (x
∗
j )
1+λ = 1−ξ8 y
∗
j (h), with τ1 = 1 < τ2 so 1 has a competitive hedge in fund-raising. It can be checked
that the voter pays more attention to the leading candidate 1, which exacerbates the benefit of lower fund-raising
cost.
22One might wonder whether the small return on campaign expenditures found in Levitt (1997) and (to a lesser
extent) Stratmann (2009) also suffers from upward omitted variable bias (Stratmann controls for the price of adver-
tising and finds bigger estimates than Levitt). Levitt and Stratmann control for candidates’ quality with candidates
fixed effects and changes in fund-raising ability with time fixed effect. As they do not control for change in the
electorate’s opinion of candidates, their estimate are also likely to be upwardly biased. However, since the sample is
restricted to repeated races, change in perceived candidates’ qualities is likely to be minimal and so is the bias.
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coverage or franking privileges). This source of the incumbency advantage is usually estimated
by an RD design exploiting close elections. This methodological approach might seem at first
immune from our theoretical critique. However, if one assumes that an incumbent’s past vote share
is correlated with present reputational imbalance, our theory suggest that RD designs provide an
unbiased estimate of the personal incumbency advantage only if two conditions are satisfied.
First, it is necessary that researchers approximate as closely as possible conditions at the 50−
50 threshold to avoid the upward omitted variable bias generated by the exacerbating effect of
campaigns. This condition is unlikely to be satisfied when researchers use a naive optimal bandwidth
approach. As such, our theory points to the importance of adopting a flexible polynomial approach
in RD design (for empirical results consistent with our conclusion, see Hyytinen et al., 2014).
A second necessary condition is that at the 50 − 50 threshold, the electorate has the same
opinion of the incumbent and challenger since the exacerbating effect depends on perceived rather
than actual candidates’ quality. Recent empirical evidence and theoretical advances suggest that
this condition is unlikely to be satisfied.23 Fowler (2015) documents that the electorate has little
information about past electoral outcomes and thus tends to over-estimate the incumbent’s quality.
Furthermore, as Eggers (2014) and Folwer (2015) demonstrate, even under perfect recall of past
electoral margin, a voter would hold the same opinion of a closely elected incumbent and his
challenger only if the distribution of candidates’ characteristics is perfectly symmetric.24 In other
words, our theory suggests that RD designs are likely to be misidentified because the necessary
assumption that the electorate’s opinion of candidates is smooth at the threshold is likely to be
violated.
Lastly, we show that reputational imbalance has a positive effect on the performance of the
electoral process, as measured by the probability the voter obtains her preferred policy (see Figure
2c for φ ≤ φ).
Property 4.6. The probability the common value policy is implemented increases with reputational
imbalance.
23Our critique of RD design holds even in the absence of concerns about sorting around the threshold (Grimmer
et al., 2010; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Eggers et al., 2015).
24In our model, a 50 − 50 outcome (measured by the interim winning probability) occurs when both candidates
are either low quality or high quality. Conditioning only on this event, the voter believes that the incumbent and
his challengers have the same probability of being high quality due to our assumption that Pr(t = h) = 1/2. If
Pr(t = h) = q > 1/2, then the voter would update positively on the incumbent’s quality following a close election.
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The voter conditions her level of attention on the pivotal event that a high-quality candidate faces
a low-quality candidate. When it comes to the leading candidate 1, this probability is q1(1− q2) =(
1+φ
2
)2
. It is increasing and convex in the level of reputational imbalance (φ). When it comes to the
trailing candidate 2, the probability of the pivotal event is q2(1− q1) =
(
1−φ
2
)2
. It is decreasing and
convex in the level of imbalance; hence, it does not decrease too fast. As a result, the increase in the
likelihood to detect a high-quality candidate 1 more than compensates the decrease for candidate
2.
As reputational imbalance increases, the voter becomes on average better able to detect high-
quality candidates and her ex-ante welfare increases (voter welfare is an affine transformation of the
probability the common value policy is implemented). Our theory suggests that less competitive
elections (Property 4.4) can improve voter welfare (Property 4.6). As a consequence, whenever the
level of reputational imbalance is low, measures meant to improve the degree of electoral competition
(e.g., caps on campaign expenditures) can reduce accountability.
4.2 High level of reputational imbalance
For high level of reputational imbalance, the responsive equilibrium does not exist (Proposition
2). Consequently, a high φ always hurts the voter (see the drop around φ in Figure 2c). The
reason is that the voter pays too little attention to the trailing candidate to induce him to choose
the common value policy. The voter cannot do better than a semi-responsive equilibrium when
only one candidate commits to the common value policy when high-quality. As the voter wants
to maximize the probability that her preferred policy is implemented, the best semi-responsive
equilibrium features the leading candidate proposing p = 1 when high-quality. The next proposition
establishes that this equilibrium is always attainable when the implementation cost is not too high.
Proposition 3. There exists kA1h ∈ (0, 1) such that, when kh ≤ kA1h , there exists for all φ ≥ 0 a
semi-responsive equilibrium in which the leading candidate 1 commits to the common value policy
when high quality and the trailing candidate always commits to the partisan policy.
In the best semi-responsive equilibrium, the leading candidate spends significantly more than his
opponent (Figure 2a for φ > φ) and wins with a large probability (Figure 2b for φ > φ). Our theory
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thus predicts that a large level of reputational imbalance is associated with a lopsided election (as
documented by Abramowitz et al., 2006).
(a) Campaign expenditures (b) 1’s winning probability (c) Probability of p = 1
Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes with reputational imbalance
In Figures 2a, the black plain lines correspond to the leading candidate 1, the dashed blue line to the trailing candidate
2. In Figure 2b, the black line corresponds to the leading candidate’s ex-ante winning probability. In Figure 2c, the
black line is the (ex-ante) probability that the common value policy is implemented. Parameter values: kh = 0.075,
ξ = 3/4, λ = 2.
The analysis above establishes that candidates’ behaviors and electoral outcomes are markedly
different for moderate (φ ≤ φ) and high (φ > φ) levels of reputational imbalance (see Figure 2).
Consequently, our theory highlights that local average treatment effect of the electoral consequences
of reputational imbalance might differ significantly from average treatment effect. In particular, the
external validity of RD design based on close elections might be limited.
5 The consequences of partisan imbalance
We now turn attention to the effect of partisan imbalance, fixing the level of reputational imbalance
to zero: φ = 0 so q1 = q2 = 1/2. As for reputational imbalance, we discuss separately the cases of
moderate and high levels of partisan imbalance.
5.1 Moderate level of partisan imbalance
By Proposition 2, the responsive equilibrium exists for moderate level of partisan imbalance. An
increase in partisan imbalance does not affect candidates’ platform choices, but changes voter’s
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choice of attention and candidates’ campaign expenditures. As Property 5.1 establishes, the voter
pays more attention to the trailing candidate 2.
Property 5.1. The voter always pays more attention to the trailing candidate 2 than the leading
candidate 1: x∗2 > x
∗
1 whenever δ > 0. Furthermore, voter attention towards the trailing (leading)
candidate increases (decreases) with partisan imbalance.
Absent any additional information, the voter’s electoral decision is based on the partisan swing.
Since the partisan swing favors candidate 1, the risk of wrongly electing a low-quality candidate
1 is higher than wrongly electing a low-quality candidate 2. Consequently, the voter pays more
attention to the trailing candidate 2.
As a result of greater voter attention, the trailing candidate 2 has greater incentive to incur
campaign expenditures. But candidates’ marginal benefit from campaign expenditures also depend
directly on partisan imbalance (see (3) and (4) when δ > 0). Partisan imbalance implies that a high-
quality candidate 1’s electoral chances are high even in the absence of successful communication.
This diminishes his marginal benefit of campaign spending. The reverse holds true for the trailing
candidate 2. Consequently, the direct effect of partisan imbalance and the indirect effect through
voter attention go in the same direction and the leading candidate’s campaign expenditures are
always lower than his opponent’s (see Figure 3a for δ ≤ δ).
Property 5.2. The trailing candidate 2 always incurs higher campaign expenditures than the lead-
ing candidate 1: y∗2(h) > y
∗
1(h) whenever δ > 0. Furthermore, the trailing (leading) candidate’s
campaign expenditures increase (decrease) with partisan imbalance.
Since the trailing candidate 2 outspends his opponent and the voter pays more attention to
candidate 2, she is more likely to learn candidate 2’s platform. This is the mitigating effect of elec-
toral campaigns. This mitigating effect implies that the electoral gain due to partisan imbalance is
limited: the difference in (ex-ante) winning probabilities is always smaller than the underlying level
of partisan imbalance (δ). Partisan imbalance, however, always generates an electoral advantage for
the leading candidate: his winning probability is always strictly greater than 1/2 as the mitigating
effect benefits only a high-quality candidate 2, whereas partisan imbalance improves the electoral
chances of all types of candidate 1.
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Property 5.3. The leading candidate’s (ex-ante) winning probability is strictly greater than 1/2 for
all δ > 0. However, the difference in ex-ante winning probabilities between the leading and trailing
candidate is strictly lower than δ for all δ > 0.
Property 5.3 provides a theoretical foundation for the small impact of partisan redistricting—
arguably, a major source of partisan imbalance25—on electoral outcomes documented in the empiri-
cal literature (Gelman and King, 1994; Niemi and Abramowitz, 1994). Gelman and King argue that
this moderate effect is due to the uncertainty associated with the redistricting process. This paper
provides an alternative explanation based on voter’s strategic response to partisan imbalances.
Voter’s strategic choice of attention can also help explain why empirical researchers (e.g., Kendall
and Rekkas, 2012; Fowler and Hall, 2014; da Fonseca, 2015) have consistently documented a stronger
personal incumbency advantage than partisan incumbency advantage—the electoral benefit of a
candidate arising simply from belonging to the incumbent party. This difference may be due to
the exacerbating effect of campaigns generated by reputational imbalance (which, as we argued
above, constitutes part of the estimated personal incumbency advantage) and the mitigating effect
of campaigns caused by partisan imbalance.
While our theory explains several key empirical regularities identified in the literature, the
analysis of the consequences of partisan imbalance suggests ways to test it further. First, campaign
expenditures should be negatively correlated with partisan imbalance (Property 5.2). Second, as
a result of Properties 5.1 and 5.2, voters should know more about the trailing candidate’s policy
stance than the leading candidate’s.26
Lastly, we show that partisan imbalance improves the performance of the electoral process.
Property 5.4. The probability the common value policy is implemented increases with partisan
imbalance.
An increase in partisan imbalance has two first-order effects: it decreases the leading candidate’s
campaign expenditures and increases the trailing candidate’s. These changes trigger two second-
order effects. First, the leading candidate 1’s marginal benefit of campaign expenditures increases
25For empirical evidence, see Campagna and Grofman (1990). For a theoretical foundation, see Gu¨l and Pesendorfer
(2010).
26Notice that in order to test this prediction, one needs to hold reputational imbalance constant, since it has the
opposite effect on candidates’ campaign spending, voter attention and learning.
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(there is a greater chance that successful electoral communication determines the outcome of the
election). Second, the trailing candidate’s marginal benefit of campaign expenditures increases as
well due to the decrease in his opponent’s spending. Consequently, the leading candidate’s campaign
spending is less responsive to partisan imbalance than the trailing candidate’s and the voter is on
average more likely to detect high-quality candidates.
As for reputational imbalance, a decrease in electoral competition (Property 5.3) can be associ-
ated with an increase in the voter welfare (Property 5.4). Consequently, partisan redistricting does
not necessarily impede accountability. Moving to a more neutral process (as advocated by several
organizations, e.g. Redrawing the Lines) might have negative unintended consequences. While
not arguing against non-partisan redistricting, this paper shows that the effect of such policy is
conditional on the pre-existing level of partisan imbalance.
5.2 High level of partisan imbalance
For high level of partisan imbalance, the responsive equilibrium does not exist (Proposition 2).
Consequently, the probability the voter obtains her preferred policy (and her welfare) decreases
(see the drop around δ in Figure 3c). This implies that partisan and reputational imbalances
have a similar reduced form effect on political accountability. However, this similarity masks a
very different structural relationship. For large level of reputational imbalance, the responsive
equilibrium does not exist because the voter pays too little attention to the trailing candidate.
For large level of partisan imbalance, the responsive equilibrium does not exist because the voter
pays too little attention to the leading candidate. Our theory highlights the challenge of designing
all-encompassing regulatory solutions for different types of electoral imbalances. Regulation must
be sensitive to the level of imbalance (Properties 4.6 and 5.4) as well as the type of imbalance it is
meant to address.
When the responsive equilibrium does not exist, the voter prefers a semi-responsive equilibrium
with the leading candidate committing to the common value policy when high quality.27 The reason
is that, due to partisan imbalance, the voter is always more likely to elect the leading candidate
(hence less likely to make an electoral mistake). The leading candidate 1, however, has little
incentive to commit to the common value policy because of the electoral advantage (independent
27See Appendix F for a formal proof.
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of his policy commitment) generated by partisan imbalance.28 The voter then might be unable to
do better than a semi-responsive equilibrium with the trailing candidate proposing p = 1 when
high quality. In this equilibrium, the trailing candidate’s winning probability can be significantly
larger than 50%. Partisan imbalance can thus have negative electoral consequences for the leading
candidate 1 (see Figure 3b, which is right censored, for δ > δ). The following proposition, however,
shows that (sufficiently) high level of partisan imbalances always generates an electoral advantage
for the leading candidate.
Proposition 4. There exists δW1 ∈ [δ, 1) such that in any equilibrium, the leading candidate 1’s
ex-ante winning probability is greater than 1/2 for all δ ≥ δW1.
(a) Campaign expenditures (b) 1’s winning probability (c) Probability of p = 1
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes with partisan imbalance
In Figures 3a, the black plain lines correspond to the leading candidate 1, the dashed blue line to the trailing
candidate 2. In Figure 3b, the black line is the leading candidate’s ex-ante winning probability (the dotted red line
corresponds to (1 + δ)/2). In Figure 3c, the black line is the (ex-ante) probability that the common value policy is
implemented. Parameter values: kh = 0.075, ξ = 3/4, λ = 2.
6 Combining reputational and partisan imbalances
The previous sections study separately reputational and partisan imbalances. Here, we briefly
discuss the joint consequences of moderate levels of both imbalances (i.e., focusing on the responsive
equilibrium). All claims are formally derived in Appendix E.
As pointed out above, electoral campaigns mitigate the effect of partisan imbalance: the voter
is more likely to learn the trailing candidate’s platform. This result holds in the presence of reputa-
28In addition, the voter pays little attention to candidate 1 since she is likely to elect him absent new information.
This means a low electoral reward for committing to the common value policy.
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tional imbalance. Consequently, partisan imbalance tends to diminish the exacerbating effect and
electoral advantage caused by reputational imbalance. Partisan imbalance reduces the incumbency
advantage, in line with empirical evidence in Ansolabehere et al. (2000).
Moderate levels of electoral imbalance (whether reputational or partisan) always improve po-
litical accountability by increasing the probability the common value policy is implemented. The
beneficial effect of reputational imbalance, however, is primarily driven by voter attention (the up-
ward change in her attention towards the leading candidate dominates her reduction in attention
towards the trailing candidate). In contrast, the positive impact of partisan imbalance is due to
candidates’ behavior (candidate 1 is less responsive than candidate 2). Consequently, both types
of imbalance have a complementary effect on accountability. Adding partisan imbalance to reputa-
tional imbalance increases the likelihood the voter obtains her preferred policy.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a unified theoretical framework to study the consequences of reputational
and partisan imbalances. Our theory can account for several empirical regularities: the significant
electoral premium resulting from reputational imbalance (e.g., caused by incumbency), the existence
of an incumbency spending advantage, and the limited impact of partisan imbalance (e.g., caused by
partisan redistricting). We show that these different empirical regularities are caused in a significant
part by voter’s strategic choice of attention. As a result, empirical studies of the consequences
of electoral imbalance which do not properly control for voter attention, including RD designs,
potentially suffer from a severe omitted variable bias.
Moderate levels of electoral imbalances decrease the degree of electoral competition, but also
increase the likelihood that the electorate’s preferred policy is implemented. Large levels of partisan
and reputational imbalances, however, always hurt voter welfare, but for very different reasons. Any
reform meant to address the negative consequences of electoral imbalances must be precisely tailored
to their level and their type.
Our theory assumes a common value policy and unmediated communication between candidates
and the electorate. Future research would do well to study the performance of the electoral process in
ideological domains as well as the role of the media when voters face significant cognitive constraints.
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